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Abstract
Effects of activity spillover from neighbouring agents for a noisy binary
choice game (Ising game) on a complete graph are studied. Binary choice
games are very important for both economics and statistical physics. Here
we investigate self-excited Hawkes activity applied to a noisy binary choice
game. Particular attention is drawn to the affecting the decision-taking
rate.
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1. Introduction
Studies of noisy binary choice games are of special interest because of the
existence of close parallels to statistical physics of spin systems, in particular to
static and dynamic properties of phase transitions in them [1, 2, 3]. These par-
allels are particularly intriguing because of the fundamentally different origins
of equilibria in game theory and statistical physics: in game theory equilibration
is a result of balancing individual interests while in statistical physics equilibra-
tion is a search of a global minimum of free energy. For the noisy binary choice
problem on complete graphs it is long known, see [1] and references therein,
that for a special choice of noise game-theoretic equilibria are characterised by
the mean-field Curie-Weiss equation, see e.g. [3], describing phase transitions in
magnetics. Recently in [4] it was established that static game-theoretic equilib-
ria in noisy binary choice games on graphs correspond to the so-called quantal
response equilibria [5].
The dynamics of games can, however, be fundamentally different from con-
ventional spin dynamics due to a variety of possible mechanisms. One of these
is a possibility of activity spillover (self-excitation) that was intensively studied
for so-called Hawkes processes [6] with applications to finance [7, 8], earthquakes
[9] and other subjects, see the recent review in [10]. Recently a master equation
formalism for such processes was developed in [11, 12].
The main idea of the present paper is studying the effects of an activity
spillover different from the Hawkes self-excitation mechanism having is origin in
the activity spillover from neighbouring agents for a noisy binary choice game
(Ising game) on a complete graph.
2. Self-excited dynamical Ising game
2.1. Game description
In what follows we consider a dynamical noisy binary choice game of N
agents on a graph G. The strategy space of each agent i includes two strategies
si = ±1 so at given time t the system is fully characterised by the set st =
(s1, . . . , sn)t. The temporal evolution of the strategies configuration st → st+δt
within a small time interval dt is assumed to be driven by a strategy flip si → −si
of some agent i:
(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn)t → (s1, . . . ,−si, . . . , sn)t (1)
The flip probability pii,t within a time interval (t, t + δt) is assumed to have a
form
pii,t = λi(t)δt γ(si → −si|s−i,t) (2)
where λi(t)δt is a time-dependent probability of having a possibility for an agent
i to reconsider a strategy within a time interval (t, t+ δt) and γ(si → −si|s−i,t)
is a probability of changing a strategy dependent of the current configuration
s−i,t of strategies in the neighbourhood Vi of the node i. Let us denote the
sequence of flip times of an agent i by {tki }i∈N. The main effect studied in
the present paper is the acceleration of the flip activity of the node i by the
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preceding flip activity of its neighbours so that
λi(t) = λ0 +
∑
k∈Vi
∑
tkj<t
h(t− t(k)j ), (3)
where h(t− t′) is a memory kernel. Equation (3) describes flip activity spillover
from the neighbours of a node and is therefore a generalisation of the Hawkes
activity spillover which is self-induced. The case of constant intensity λi(t) = λ0
corresponds to a standard poissonian dynamics underlying the Ising game, see
e.g. [1, 4].
In what follows we shall assume an Ising-Glauber flip rate
γi(t) =
1
2
[
1− si tanh
(
βJ
∑
k∈Vi
sk(t)
)]
, (4)
where β = 1/T is an inverse temperature and J = J/N is an Ising coupling
constant and a markovian exponential memory kernel
h(t) = µe−bt (5)
In the present study we consider a complete graph topology in which at large
N equation (4) takes the form [2, 1]:
γ(t) =
1
2
[1− si tanh (βJm(t))] → γ±(m) = 1
2
(1± tanh(βJm)) (6)
where γ± = γ(∓s→ ±s) and
m(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
si (7)
As for the memory kernel, it turns out convenient to change normalisation
so that
λ(t) = λ0 +
µ
N
∑
τk
e−b(t−τk) (8)
As all vertices in the complete graph are equivalent in describing the system
evolution it is natural to use a collective intensity of the flip process Λ(t) =
Nλ(t).
2.2. Dynamical evolution
A state of the system at any given time is fully described by the values
(Λ(t),m(t)). Their evolution in the time interval [t; t+ δt) is driven by the two
following mechanisms:
• The strategy flips −1 → 1 or 1 → −1 leading to a constant shift in
the process intensity Λ → Λ + µ and a change in the average strategy
m→ m± 1/N taking place with the following probabilities pi±
(Λ,m)→
(
Λ + µ,m± 2
N
)
↔ pi± = Λδt · γ±(m)1∓m
2
(9)
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• Decrease of the rate Λ taking place in the absence of a strategy flip
(Λ,m)→ ((Λ− Λ0)ebδt + Λ0,m) (10)
occurring with the probability
pi0 = 1− Λδt
(
γ−(m)
1 +m
2
+ γ+(m)
1−m
2
)
(11)
From equations (9,10,11) we obtain the following master equation for the
probability density function P (Λ,m; t)
∂P (Λ,m; t)
∂t
= b
∂
∂Λ
(
(Λ− Λ0)P (Λ,m; t)
)
+
(
(Λ− µ)
(
m+ 1
2
+
1
N
)
γ−
(
m+
2
N
)
P (Λ− µ,m+ 2
N
; t)
+ (Λ− µ)
(
1−m
2
+
1
N
)
γ+
(
m− 2
N
)
P (Λ− µ,m− 2
N
; t)
− Λ
(
m+ 1
2
γ−(m) +
1−m
2
γ+(m)
)
P (Λ,m; t)
)
(12)
Let us note that if one neglects evolution of m, equation (12) coincides with the
master equation for Poissonian self-excited processes obtained in [11].
From (12) a standard computation in the limit N →∞ leads us to the fol-
lowing Fokker-Planck equation describing the Brownian motion in space (m,λ),
∂tP = ∂i(fiP ) +
1
N
∂ij (gijP )
fi =
(
λ [m− tanh(βJm)]
−λ [1−m tanh(βJm)] + b [λ− λ0]
)
gij =
(
λ [1−m tanh(βJm)] −λ [m− tanh(βJm)]
−λ [m− tanh(βJm)] λ [1−m tanh(βJm)]
)
, (13)
and due to smallness 1/2N , the following evolution equations for m and λ:
m˙(t) = −λ(t) [m(t)− tanh(βJm(t))] (14)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) [1−m(t) tanh(βJm(t))]− b [λ(t)− λ0] , (15)
where we have performed the following rescaling of the variables:
λ→ 2λ
µ
, λ0 → 2λ0
µ
, b→ 2b
µ
, t→ µt
2
.
Equation (14) is nothing else but the standard evolution of the average
opinion on a complete graph [1, 2, 4] that is also equivalent to the mean-field
evolution equation for the Ising model [3] with the time-dependent intensity
λ(t). From equation (14) it is clear that the stationary configurations of the
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Ising game under consideration are the same as in the constant intensity case
λ = λ0 and are described by by the Curie-Weiss equation [1, 2, 4]
meq = tanh(βJmeq), (16)
the difference with the standard case being due to the temporal evolution of
relaxation intensity described by equation (15). The equilibrium configurations
meq(β) described by the corresponding solutions of (16) are therefore the con-
ventional ones: meq = 0 at high temperatures βJ < 1 and meq = ±m0(β) at
low temperatures βJ > 1.
As to the characteristic regimes of evolution of the process intensity, it is con-
venient to consider the vicinity of equilibrium m ∼ meq in which from equations
(15), (16) there follows that
λ˙(t) ' [1−m2eq − b]λ(t) + bλ0 (17)
so that
λ(t) =
λ0
1−m2eq − b
[
(1−m2eq)e(1−m
2
eq−b)t − b
]
(18)
The two characteristic regimes corresponding to growing and relaxing intensity
are thus characterised by the following asymptotic behavior:
1−m2eq − b > 0 → λ(t)|t→∞ ∼
e(1−m
2
eq−b)t
1−m2eq − b
λ0
1−m2eq − b < 0 → λ(t)|t→∞ ∼
b
m2eq + b− 1
λ0 (19)
From the derived system of evolution equations (14), (15) it is clear that
the main effect of time-dependent intensity should be in speeding up relaxation
to the appropriate temperature - dependent equilibrium. A nontrivial part of
this effect is its dependence on the characteristic memory timescale τλ = 1/b.
At parametrically small τλ (large b) one expects a rapid recovery of the base
intensity λ0 while at large τλ (small b) one, on the contrary, expects a prolonged
period of high-intensity evolution. Therefore at large b the influence of self-
excitement in the game development should be small while at large b it should,
on the contrary, be large.
In the high-temperature phase βJ < 1 the game has only one equilibrium
configuration meq = 0. In Fig. 1 (a - d) we show relaxation from the initial state
m(0) = 1 for a set of values of b at various temperatures T < 1/J in comparison
to the Poisson case. As expected, at all temperatures the self-excited game
relaxes faster than in the Poissonian case with relaxation becoming slower with
diminishing b. In Fig. 1 (c,d) we also clearly observe the critical slowing down
of relaxation characteristic for dynamics in the vicinity of the phase transition
point βJ = 1.
In the low-temperature phase βJ > 1 the Curie-Weiss equation has three
solutions: the (dynamically) unstable one at meq = 0 and a pair of temperature
dependent stable equilibria at meq = ±m0(T ) such that at the critical point
Tc = J one has m0(Tc) = 0 and at T → 0 one has m0 → 1.
The relaxation to the stable equilibria is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a-d) where
for definitiveness we have chosen the equilibrium corresponding to meq = m0
Similar to the results on above-described case of high temperature equilibrium
shown in Fig. 1 (a-d), the bigger is b, the faster is the relaxation to equilibrium.
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Figure 1. Relaxation from the initial state m(0) = 1 to the equilibrium meq = 0
at b = 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 10 and Poisson case at different temperatures: a) βJ = 0.1,
b) βJ = 0.5, c) βJ = 0.9, d) βJ = 0.99.
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Figure 2. Relaxation from the initial state m = 0 to the equilibrium meq = m0
at b = 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 10 and Poisson case at different temperatures:: a) βJ = 1.1,
b) βJ = 1.5, c) βJ = 2, d) βJ = 10.
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3. Conclusion
The self-excited version of the Ising game on a complete graph was con-
sidered. The considered mechanism of self-excitation was an activity spillover
from the neighbouring agents affecting the decision-taking rate at a node under
consideration. Fokker-Planck equation describing Brownian motion in space
of the average opinion and the process intensity, as well as system of evolu-
tion equations for the average opinion and the process intensity generalising the
Curie-Weiss equations, were derived using the master equation formalism. A
detailed dependence of the relaxation acceleration on the parameters of the Pois-
sonian memory kernel was studied. A further interesting aspect for theoretical
work is to study escape from one stable equilibria to another.
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